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This paper brings new empirical evidence on the impact of the choice of ownership and regulatory regime 
on firms’ productivity and prices paid by consumers. The evidence is collected from a sample of electricity 
distribution companies in Latin-America. For efficiency, we rely on estimations of a parametric labor and 
operation and maintenance (O&M) input requirement functions using alternative. We then analyze the 
correlation between prices and productivity changes. The main conclusions of the paper are: a) private 
firms perform better (approximately 30%) than public firms; b) the regulatory regimes matter; c) private 
firms operating under rate of return are at most as efficient as public firms; d) there is no clear pattern of 
differences in electricity prices according to the regulatory regime; and e) final prices fell in general but the 
drop did not match the productivity gains, implying that the operators and the state share some of the gains 
in the form of rents and higher tax revenue, respectively. 
                                                                 
1 We are grateful to Simon Cowan, Martin Rodriguez-Pardina, Sergio Perelman and Lourdes Trujillo for 
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The last two decades witnessed major reforms in the organization of the electricity 
sector around the globe. Apart from the reduction in the fiscal costs and the increase in 
private financing of the sector, one of the main reform goals was to improve its 
efficiency. To realize these efficiency gains, in most cases and in particular in developing 
countries, the reforms were built around five main groups: (i) unbundling of generation, 
transmission, and distribution activities, (ii) privatization of the assets (for generation) or 
of the management of these assets (for transmission and distribution), (iii) promotion of 
competition in the market in generation,  (iv) promotion of competition for the market in 
the other segments, and (v) increase in the incentive power of the residual regulation 
needed by switching from rate of return (cost-plus, cost of service) regulation to high-
incentive regulatory schemes.
2  
As a result of these changes in the electricity sector, in most fully or partially 
reformed countries, the generation s egment is now competitive with a very strong 
presence of the private sector, while transmission companies are now largely public 
monopolies often separated from the other sectors. The largest diversity of service 
organization is found in the distribution activity, where public and private companies 
coexist in many countries.  
Following the global trend, the Latin American electricity market has undergone a 
major transformation over the past 20 years. Reform in the region started in Chile, with 
the privatization of major electric utilities between 1986 and 1989. Argentina followed 
Chile’s example in 1992; shortly thereafter Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru followed suit. 
                                                                 
2 For a review of the theoretical literature on regulatory regimes, see Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986; Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993; Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers, 1994; Sappington, 1994; Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002; 
and Vogelsang, 2002.   3 
During the second half of the 1990s, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, and Brazil also adopted reforms. The main missing players in the process of 
transforming the electricity sectors have been Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela, although Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela recently 
initiated actions toward restructuring.  
Many authors have studied the impact of the reforms in the region, documenting an 
increase in labor productivity in all the countries where restructuring and privatization 
has taken place (see Rudnick, 1998; Fischer and Serra, 2000; and Rudnick and Zolezzi, 
2001). The results obtained from these studies, however, rely on partial productivity 
ratios and focus on labor productivity. In this study we provide additional empirical 
evidence by using a more comprehensive labor requirement function approach to 
examine whether ownership type and type of regulatory regime have any systematic 
impact on labor productivity, labor productivity change, or both.  
An important finding of our study is that there were substantial increases in labor 
productivity in the post-reform period (1994-2001). The current debate in the region is 
whether final consumers have benefited from this increase in labor productivity. As a first 
approach to address this issue, in this study we explore whether the increases in labor 
productivity have had an effect on lower prices for final consumers. To generate the 
evidence, we exploit a unique database described in an Appendix..  
Model specification of electricity distribution  
The electricity distribution model used in this paper includes a variable input (the 
number of employees), an exogenous capital input (the kilometres of distribution 
network), and three exogenous outputs (the number of final customers, the total energy   4 
supplied to final customers, and the service area). Table 1 lists summary statistics of the 
data.  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Inputs and Outputs 
(Number of observations = 470) 
Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Maximum  Minimum  
Number of employees  1953  5209  41063  88 
Sales (in GWh)  6883  20383  175498  58 
Number of customers  868194  2296233  19760000  21368 
Service area (in km
2)  109613  275024  1889910  32 
Distribution lines (in km)  27778  78770  595170  105 
Private firms dummy  0.44  0.50  1  0 
O&M expenses (PPP) 
(Number of observations = 190) 
157881  259300  1833086  695 
Sample distribution of firms by country and ownership category 
  Number of 
firms 






to private firms 
Argentina  22  12  5  117  70 
Bolivia  2  1  0  12  7 
Brazil  37  16  0  113  44 
Chile  2  2  0  14  14 
Colombia  5  1  0  17  2 
Costa Rica  3  0  0  21  0 
Ecuador  12  2  1  40  8 
El Salvador  4  4  0  12  12 
Mexico  1  0  0  8  0 
Panama  1  1  0  1  1 
Paraguay  1  0  0  7  0 
Peru  11  1  7  64  24 
Uruguay  1  0  0  8  0 
Venezuela  8  5  0  36  23 
Total  110  45  13  470  205 











to private firms 
88-400  41  14  8  178  76 
401-1000  36  12  5  142  68 
1001-41063  33  19  0  150  61 
 
A pattern observed in Table 1 is that most of the firms changing ownership are 
relative small firms from Argentina and Peru. The sample distribution of firms ordered by 
number of employees indicates that both the number of firms and the  number of 
observations are similarly distributed in the different size categories. The same applies to   5 
the number of private firms and to the number of observations corresponding to private 
firms.  
As observed by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998), while productivity in 
electricity generation is mainly determined by the technology, productivity in distribution 
is, to a large extent, driven by management and efficient labor use;
3 accordingly, the 
baseline model focuses on labor productivity, and the electricity distribution technology 
is represented by means of a labor requirement function.  
In order to estimate a parametric labor requirement function, we use a translog 
functional form because it provides a good second-order approximation to a broad class 
of functions. A translog labor requirement function with three outputs and one exogenous 
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where  1234 , , , , and   lyyyy  are the natural logarithms of labor, sales, customers, area, and 
distribution lines,  PR D  is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is private, and v is 




Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the labor requirement function model are 
reported in Table 2. As usual for translog function approximations, outputs and the 
                                                                 
3 Typically, the labor cost share in generation amounts to less than 10% while in distribution the figure is 
around 50% (net of electricity generation and national grid transmission costs).  
4 For simplicity, we assume a neutral (and linear) technical change specification. The empirical results were 
unchanged when a non-neutral technical change specification was estimated.   6 
capital input have been mean corrected; therefore, the first-order output coefficients are 
elasticities evaluated at the sample mean.  
Table 2: Estimates of labor requirement function 
  Dependent variable: number of employees, in logs 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  0.513  0.174  1.645  1.616  1.432 
  (8.83)  (0.33)  (1.23)  (1.20)  (1.18) 
Ln (Sales)  0.375  0.365  0.253  0.253  0.322 
  (9.21)  (8.43)  (5.19)  (5.17)  (6.88) 
Ln (Customers)
  0.337  0.350  0.535  0.538  0.426 
  (4.61)  (4.70)  (7.14)  (7.19)  (5.71) 
Ln (Service area)  0.112  0.109  0.078  0.084  0.091 
  (7.05)  (6.71)  (4.45)  (4.48)  (5.56) 
Ln (Distribution network)  -0.013  -0.014  -0.022  -0.028  -0.005 
  (-0.27)  (-0.28)  (-0.45)  (-0.57)  (-0.12) 
Time  -0.076  -0.077  -0.058  -0.051  -0.060 
  (-8.18)  (-8.08)  (-5.77)  (-4.00)  (-6.53) 
Time*Private firms dummy        -0.017   
        (-0.95)   
Ln (GNP per capita)
    0.039  -0.142  -0.140  -0.109 
    (0.64)  (-0.88)  (-0.85)  (-0.73) 
Private firms dummy  -0.305  -0.311  -0.410  -0.323  -0.405 
  (-6.46)  (-6.22)  (-8.03)  (-3.17)  (-8.32) 
Country dummies
†  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log likelihood  -249.92  -249.73  -180.00  -179.49  -133.11 
R-squared  0.89  0.89  0.92  0.92  0.93 
Number of firms  110  110  110  110  108 
Observations  470  470  470  470  451 
Notes:  t-ratios obtained by using heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors are in parentheses.  In all 
cases we are estimating a translog form. To save space, second order terms are not shown. In all models the 
Cobb-Douglas specification is rejected against a translog at the 1% level.  
In the model in column (5) Ln (Sales) was replaced by Ln (Sales + Network losses).  
† In models (3) to (5) the country dummies are significant at the 1% level. 
 
In all models, the first-order output coefficients are significant at the usual levels of 
confidence and have the expected signs regarding economic behaviour—an increase in 
outputs is associated with an increase in the use of labor. The coefficient on kilometres of 
distribution network is never significant. The values of the estimated coefficients suggest 
that labor use is mainly driven by the electricity sold and the number of customers.  
The coefficient of the time trend is negative and significant at the 1% level in all six 
models; the average rate of labor productivity growth is in the range of 5.1% to 7.7%,   7 
numbers that are consistent with previous findings in the specialized literature (see 
Rudnick, 1998; Fischer and Serra, 2000; and Rudnick and Zolezzi, 2001). In all cases we 
test the null hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas specification against the more general translog 
using the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic and we are able to reject the null at the 1% level. 
Overall, estimates regarding technological parameters are in line with the specialized 
literature on electricity distribution, yielding further confidence to the validity of the 
estimation strategy. 
In the baseline model in column (1), the coefficient of the dummy corresponding to 
private firms is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that private firms are 
more labor efficient than their public counterparts. The coefficient is also significant in 
economic terms: private firms use about 30% less labor to produce a given bundle of 
outputs than public firms.  
In order to avoid possible omitted variable biases, we extend the baseline model by 
including GNP per capita. As reported in column (2), GNP per capita is not significant at 
any of the usual levels of confidence. Besides, the addition of GNP per capita to the 
model appears not to have any effect on the sign, values, and significance of other 
coefficients. 
Even after controlling for GNP per capita, it might be still argued that the estimates 
are biased as the ownership effect is confounded with all the other country-level 
differences which affect firm performance. In order to control for potential biases caused 
by any omitted variable that is country specific and time invariant we include country 
fixed-effects. Results corresponding to the specification with country dummies are 
reported in column (3) of Table 2. The coefficient on the private dummy is still negative   8 
and significant at the 1% level giving further confidence to the conclusion that private 
firms are more efficient than public firms.
  
In order to explore the possibility that technical change differs by ownership type 
we add the interaction between the time trend and the private ownership dummy variable 
to the model in (3). As shown in column (4) the interaction variable is not significant at 
the usual levels of confidence, suggesting a common time trend for public and private 
firms. 
We also present a model controlling by network losses—i.e., the energy that is lost 
in the distribution activity.
5 As pointed out by Bagdadioglu, Waddams Price, and 
Weyman-Jones (1996), network losses reflect the quality of the network system in terms 
of how much power was lost in the transformers and during distribution, and how much 
power was uncounted for other reasons, such as illegal use. Technical losses are strictly 
related to the square of the distance transmitted, and hence the baseline model captures 
them. The m ain concern is related to non-technical losses; if public firms face—or are 
willing to accept—higher illegal use, they will appear as inefficient because part of their 
inputs are used in the distribution of energy that is not captured by the “sales” variable 
used in the previous specifications. In order to address if not including network losses has 
any impact on the estimated coefficients, we reproduce the baseline model but replacing 
“sales” by “sales + energy losses”. As shown in column (5), the coefficient on the private 
dummy is still negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Finally, the results were unchanged when we computed clustered standard errors by 
firm or country-year combinations. We also estimated an alternative specification 
                                                                 
5 Due to lack of data on network losses for some firms, including losses in the model reduces the number of 
observations to 451—instead of 470; the mean of network losses (in percentage of energy sold) is 16%, 
with a standard deviation of 9%.   9 
allowing non-neutral technical change—introducing interactions between the time trend 
and the outputs and the capital input—with similar results. We represented technical 
change by including time fixed-effects instead of a time trend and we also obtained 
similar results.
6 
Assessing the robustness of the results 
To further address the validity of the results we estimate four alternative 
specifications: (1) stochastic frontier model; (2) between-firms variations model; (3) 
model in first differences; and (4) operating and maintenance expenditures model. 
Stochastic frontier model 
The relative efficiency of firms in the OLS model is based on the assumption that 
all firms in a particular ownership group are equally efficient. Such a restrictive 
assumption is relaxed in the following stochastic frontier model. Stochastic frontier 
models—first developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van de 
Broeck (1977)—differ from OLS by the inclusion, aside from the usual symmetric error 
reflecting noise, of a second error term reflecting inefficiency. The stochastic frontier 











=++++ ￿￿￿                               (1) 
The composite error term 
ititit vu e =+ allows for inefficiency in production 
( )
it u and for noise  ( ).
it v  The labor requirement frontier is given by equation (1) when 
0 u = . Thus, the frontier gives the minimum amount of labor required to produce a given 
level of outputs. The noise term is assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
                                                                 
6 All results reported but not presented are available from the authors upon request.    10 
( )
2 0, v N s . All  ' vs  and  ' us are assumed to be independent of each other and of the 
regressors. The 
it us  are non-negative  random variables assumed to be independently 
distributed such that 
it u  is the truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean 
it m  and variance 
2
u s . The mean 
it m  is further specified as  
0 .
itit
PRPR D mll =+   
The parameter  PR l  measures the effect that private ownership has on the mean of 
the distribution of the inefficiency term prior to truncation. If  0 PR l < , then inefficiency 
is reduced because, on average, private firms use fewer employees than public firms to 
produce an equal amount of outputs.
7 
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the stochastic labor requirement frontier 
are reported in column (1) of Table 3.
8 To derive the likelihood function, we use the 
parameterization proposed by Battese and Corra (1977):  ( )
222
uu n gsss =+ . The 
parameter g  must lie between zero and one, where zero indicates that the deviations from 









Table 3: Alternative specifications 
  Dependent variable: number of employees, in logs  O&M, in logs 




Model in  
differences 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                                                                 
7 See Battese and Coelli (1995) for a discussion on these types of models. 
8 We use the computer program FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996) to estimate the stochastic frontier 
parameters.   11 
Intercept  1.380  2.008    4.235 
  (1.05)  (1.45)    (1.37) 
Ln (Sales)  0.255  0.217  0.252  0.818 
  (8.25)  (4.01)  (2.37)  (5.28) 
Ln (Customers)
  0.538  0.577  0.238  0.227 
  (8.76)  (6.72)  (1.55)  (1.07) 
Ln (Service area)  0.079  0.097  0.133  0.092 
  (7.82)  (5.35)  (1.05)  (2.37) 
Ln (Distribution network)  -0.027  -0.035  -0.002  -0.143 
  (-0.87)  (-0.71)  (-0.03)  (-1.89) 
Time  -0.059  -0.066  -0.043  0.007 
  (-6.30)  (-6.45)  (-4.15)  (0.25) 
Time*Private firms dummy
      -0.015   
      (-1.19)   
Ln (GNP per capita)
  -0.160  -0.179  -0.060  0.732 
  (-1.00)  (-1.07)  (-0.96)  (2.18) 
Private firms dummy  -1.299  -0.460  -0.224  -0.050 
  (-13.54)  (-8.07)  (-2.34)  (-0.28) 
Intercept (stochastic frontier only)  0.435       
  (31.34)       
Stochastic frontier parameter (g )  0.124       
  (42.12)       
Country dummies
†  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Log likelihood  -141.98  -140.72  244.62  -159.30 
R-squared    0.93  0.24  0.88 
Number of firms  110  97  104  72 
Observations  470  399  350  190 
Notes: t-ratios obtained from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, except 
for the stochastic frontier specification. In all cases we are estimating a translog form. To save space, 
second order terms are not shown. In models (1), (2), and (4) the Cobb-Douglas specification is 
rejected against a translog at the 1% level. In model (3) it is rejected at the 13% level. 
† In models (1), (2), and (4) the country dummies are significant at the 1% level. 
 
The stochastic frontier estimates for the labor requirement frontier are similar to 
those of the OLS model except for the intercept, which appears to be biased upwards. 
This is in accordance with previous expectations because OLS yields consistent estimates 
of all parameters of the frontier model but the intercept.  
The estimated coefficients in the inefficiency model are of particular interest to this 
study.
9 The coefficient on the private dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
                                                                 
9 The null hypothesis,  00 :0 PR H gll === , which specifies that inefficiency effects are absent from the 
model, is rejected at the 1% level: the likelihood ratio test on the one-sided error is equal to 160.06, which 
is greater than 10.50, the critical value for three degrees of freedom obtained from Kodde and Palm (1986).   12 
a result similar to those reported in previous specifications. Thus, private firms appear to 
use fewer employees, ceteris paribus, than public firms. The value of the coefficients 
suggests that the modal private firm operates efficiently and that the modal public firm 
operates inefficiently, in the sense of using more employees to produce a given vector of 
outputs. 
Between-firms variations 
The between-firms variations model uses a subset of firms consisting of those that 
have constant ownership type. Such a sub-sample guarantees that the dummy variable 
accounts only for between-firm variations in ownership, which are more likely to capture 
a long-run effect of ownership type on efficiency.  
OLS estimates of the between-firms variations model are reported in column (2) of 
Table 3. The results are similar to those in the full sample case: the coefficient on the 
private dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that private firms 
are more efficient in the use of labor than their public counterparts. 
Model in first differences 
The previous specifications established a positive correlation between private 
ownership and firm-level efficiency.  In the early stage of the reforms, however, 
governments may wish to demonstrate that privatized firms achieve higher efficiency. To 
do so they are likely to choose to privatize firms that are already operating relatively 
efficiently, so that when privatized they provide an example of high efficiency compared 
with their remaining public sector counterparts. This would imply  that the preceding 
results might be biased in favour of finding that private ownership improves efficiency. If 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The hypothesis that inefficiency effects are not stochastic,  0 0, : H g =  is also rejected at the 1% level 
(LR=76.05>8.27).   13 
governments decide privatizations as a response to prior efficient production, one may 
still ask how changes in ownership status affect efficiency for a given firm—i.e., whether 
changes in ownership are associated with changes in labor productivity—without the 
same endogeneity concern (because any permanent influences on the level of efficiency 
have been “differenced” out).
10  
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where  C D  are country fixed-effects and GNP is the natural logarithm of GNP per capita. 
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Results from the specification in first differences estimated using OLS are reported 
in column (3) of Table 3.  As in the corresponding specification in levels (shown in 
column (4) of Table 2), the coefficient on the interaction between the time trend and the 
private ownership dummy  ( ) * tPR b  is not significant at the usual confidence levels. The 
coefficient on the time trend  ( ) t b  is negative and significant at the 1% level, and its 
value ( -0.04, with a standard error equal to 0.01) is not greatly different from the 
corresponding coefficient in the specification in levels (-0.05, with a standard error equal 
to 0.01), as shown in column (4) of Table 2. The coefficient on the private dummy ( ) PR b   
is negative and significant at the 2% level. Again, its value (-0.22, with a standard error 
equal to 0.09) i s not greatly different from the corresponding coefficient in the 
                                                                 
10 Differencing controls for only the “level” bias. If privatizations are chosen based on expected future 
improvements in efficiency, there would still be a bias.   14 
specification in levels (-0.32, with a standard error equal to 0.10), given the precision 
with which these coefficients are estimated. Thus, the estimates of the specification in 
differences suggest that the previous results are relatively robust to controlling for the 
potential endogeneity of ownership that could arise if governments privatized those 
utilities with the highest labor productivity first. 
Operating and maintenance expenditures model 
In this section we estimate an alternative model in which the dependent variable is 
the firms’ operating and maintenance (O&M) expenses instead of the number of 
employees. Using O&M expenses as the dependent variable has the advantage of taking 
into  account expenditures of works contracted outside the firm thus making more 
comparable firms with different levels of horizontal integration. For instance,  labor 
compensation packages allowed new privatized firms to outsource labor intensive 
services (e.g., cleaning services), which is not an option to most state owned firms due to 
unions’ power.  
As shown in column (4) of Table 3, the coefficient of the ownership dummy 
variable becomes insignificant in the O&M specification. This might reflect differences 
in horizontal integration levels across private and public firms. It might also be due to 
public firms incurring lower maintenance expenditures than private firms, because in 
Latin America publicly owned distribution firms generally face lower requirements of 
service quality. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that during the 1990s quality 
requirements were imposed on privatized firms, with penalties for not fulfilling those 
requirements. As Fischer and Serra (2000) document, fines for bad service were 
increased considerably at the time of privatization resulting in improvements in the   15 
quality of service (see also Rudnick and Zolezzi, 2001). In countries where privatization 
has not taken place, quality requirements have generally not improved. In Costa Rica, for 
example, the regulatory framework for the electricity sector does not contemplate fines to 
firms not delivering minimum quality levels. In Mexico, another country where the 
distribution activity is still public, there is “a deficient quality of service in electricity 
distribution”, according to the President of the Mexican Regulatory Commission.
11 Thus, 
the evidence tends to point out that the lack of data on quality of service would lead to an 
underestimation of the efficiency of private firms. Thus, this can perhaps explain results 
showing public firms being more inefficient in terms of labor use but not less efficient in 
terms of operational expenditures: this disparity might reflect the fact that public firms 
incur less maintenance expenditures because they do not need to guarantee the same 
quality of service. 
In order to check the plausibility of the above conjecture, we take advantage of 
some information available for a widely used measure for quality of service: mean 










 (where  i Ca  is the 
number of customers affected by interruption i, Cs  is the total number of customers, and 
n is the total number of interruptions). Table 4 presents sample summary statistics, by 
country, for FC.  
Table 4: Summary statistics of quality of service  
  Mean frequency of interruption per customer (FC) 
Country  Number of observations  Sample mean 
Argentina  22  6.98 
Bolivia  7  11.23 
Brazil  113  21.08 
                                                                 
11 See the report presented in the Second Hemispheric Conference of Energy Regulators that can be found 
at http://www.iie.org/programs/energy/usdoe.   16 
Chile  0   
Colombia  6  9.00 
Ecuador  4  24.63 
Paraguay  0   
Uruguay  2  17.58 
Venezuela  6  6.42 
Peru  4  22.15 
Costa Rica  15  15.02 
Panama  0   
Mexico  0   
El Salvador  0   
Total  179  17.62 
Public firms  107  19.11 
Private firms  72  15.41 
 
As shown in Table 4, the average of FC for privatized firms is lower than the 
average for public firms, giving support to the hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
ownership dummy might be biased in favour of showing public firms as more efficient. 
Regulatory Regimes 
Privatization always involves changes in both ownership and regulation, since the 
alternative to state ownership is rarely purely private, unregulated firms. Further research 
is needed in order to separate ownership effects from type of regulation effects. In this 
section we address this issue by analyzing the impact of alternative regulatory regimes 
and ownership structures on the technical efficiency of electricity distribution firms in 
Latin America (for a review of the relevant theoretical literature on regulation, see Crew 
and Kleindorfer, 1986; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers, 1994; 
Sappington, 1994; and Vogelsang, 2002).  
Latin America provides one of the best sources of evidence on the efficiency effects 
of ownership and regulatory reform in the electricity sector; during the 1990s the region 
was the champion for these reforms and, at the same time, it provides reasonable 
variation across countries in the degree of endorsement of privatization and the choices of 
regulatory regimes. About a third of the countries in the region adopted a price cap (PC)   17 
scheme and a third adopted rate of return (RoR) regulation while the last third adopted 
hybrid regimes (HR) in which some costs changes are automatically passed through to 
tariffs. This is clearly a very rough classification of regulatory regimes since the incentive 
for improvements in efficiency are strongly correlated with the specific design of the 
regime. In the case of HR, for instance, the larger the share of costs enjoying an 
automatic pass-through rule, the closer the regime is to RoR regulation and hence the 
lower the expected incentive to minimize costs. The classification is, however, useful 
enough to allow an explicit modelling of the influence of broad categories of regulation 
on the efficiency of the operators.  
Data and model specification  
The baseline econometric model used to analyze the impact of alternative 
regulatory schemes on labor productivity is the same as the one used above.  The 
information about type of regulatory regime was obtained from Espinasa (2001) and 
checked by asking regulators and governmental agencies. A classification of the type of 
regulatory regime in each of the countries in the sample is listed in Table A.2 (see 
Appendix). 
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where  1234 , , , , and   lyyyy  are the natural logarithms of labor, sales, customers, area, and 
distribution lines,  j D  is an indicator variable equal to one for private firms operating 
under regulatory regime j (see Table 5 for their descriptions), t is the time trend, and v is 
the random error term.    18 
Table 5: Definition of dummy variables 
Variable  Description  Number of observations 
PC D   Equal to 1 if the firm is private and operates under a price cap 
scheme 
117 
H D   Equal to 1 if the firm is private and operates under an hybrid 
scheme 
65 
RoR D   Equal to 1 if the firm is private and operates under a rate of 
return scheme 
23 
  Public firms (default category)  265 
 
Results 
OLS estimates of the labor requirement function are reported in column (1) of Table 
6. To avoid possible omitted variable biases, we include GNP per capita and country 
fixed effects as controls. As usual for translog function approximations, outputs have 
been mean corrected.  
In the two models presented in Table 6, the first-order output coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level and have the expected signs regarding economic behaviour—
an increase in output is associated with an increase in the use of labor. The coefficient on 
kilometres of distribution network is not significant. The coefficient of the time trend is 
negative and significant at the 1% level; the average rate of labor productivity growth is 
in the range of 5.5% to 6%. 
The coefficient on RoR is positive but not significant, indicating that private firms 
operating under RoR are not significantly different from public firms in terms of their 
efficiency levels. The PC and HR dummies are negative and significant at the 1% level. 
They are also significantly different from each other, suggesting that private firms 
operating under PC are the most efficient in this sample. These coefficients are also 
significant in economic terms: private firms operating under PC and hybrid schemes use, 
respectively, about 55% and 25% less labor to produce a given bundle of output, given 
the capital input, than public firms and private firms under RoR.   19 
Table 6: Estimates of labor requirement function 
  Dependent variable: number of employees, in logs 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  1.392  1.109 
  (1.03)  (0.77) 
Ln (Sales)  0.210  0.206 
  (3.89)  (3.71) 
Ln (Customers)
  0.619  0.627 
  (7.53)  (7.45) 
Ln (Service area)  0.097  0.099 
  (5.41)  (5.11) 
Ln (Distribution network)  -0.064  -0.069 
  (-1.27)  (-1.35) 
Time  -0.055  -0.057 
  (-5.42)  (-4.31) 
Time* Rate of return dummy variable    0.067 
    (1.29) 
Time* Hybrid regimes dummy variable    -0.008 
    (-0.41) 
Time* Price cap dummy variable    -0.002 
    (-0.08) 
Ln (GNP per capita)
  -0.133  -0.096 
  (-0.81)  (-0.55) 
Rate of return dummy variable  0.009  -0.184 
  (0.06)  (-0.75) 
Hybrid regimes dummy variable  -0.270  -0.233 
  (-3.95)  (-2.56) 
Price cap dummy variable  -0.538  -0.529 
  (-7.52)  (-3.31) 
Country dummies
†  Yes  Yes 
Log likelihood  -171.99  -170.93 
R-squared  0.92  0.92 
Number of firms  110  110 
Observations  470  470 
Notes: t-ratios obtained by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. In all cases 
we are estimating a translog form. To save space, second order terms are not shown. In all models the Cobb-
Douglas specification is rejected against a translog at the 1% level. 
† In all models the country dummies are significant at the 1% level. 
 
In order to explore the possibility that technical change differs by type of regulatory 
regime, we add the interaction between the time trend and the regulatory regime dummy 
variables to the model in column (1) of Table 6. As shown in column (2) the interaction 
variables are individually and jointly not significant at the usual confidence levels, 
suggesting a common time trend for all firms in the sample.   20 
Overall, results indicate that there is no significant difference in efficiency between 
public firms and private firms operating under a RoR regime. Firms operating under a PC 
regime are the most efficient, whereas those operating under HR are in between . 
The impact of the reforms on electricity prices 
Table 7 lists average household and industrial KWh electricity prices by country, 
both with taxes and without taxes, along with the share of private sector participation in 
the distribution activity and the type of regulatory regime under which firms’ operate.
12 
Table 7: Average electricity prices by country 




Prices corresponding to the year 2001 
  in distribution    With taxes  Without taxes 
Country  (in %)    Household  Industrial   Household  Industrial 
Argentina  70  Price cap  13.50  10.94  10.79  8.07 
Bolivia  90  Hybrid  14.90  14.02  10.02  9.67 
Brazil  60  Price cap  21.47  9.84  17.64  8.07 
Chile  90  Hybrid  16.07  10.30  13.64  8.73 
Colombia  50  Price cap  23.10  15.07  6.79  12.33 
Costa Rica  10  Rate of return  15.04  17.75     
Ecuador  20  Hybrid  16.28  18.94     
El Salvador  40  Hybrid  33.84  38.75     
Mexico  10  Rate of return  11.12  7.71     
Panama  100  Price cap  20.16  16.52  20.16  16.52 
Paraguay  0  Rate of return  24.13  13.80  22.02  12.62 
Peru  60  Hybrid  22.58  12.87  22.56  12.93 
Uruguay  0  Rate of return  18.81  9.58  15.32  7.52 
Venezuela  20  Rate of return  6.46  3.29    2.06 
Notes: All prices are at the country level, and correspond to the year 2001, except for prices without taxes 
in Colombia, which correspond to the year 2000 and were converted into 2001 price levels by using the US 
Consumer Price Index. 
Regulatory regimes and the share of private sector participation in the distribution activity for all countries 
but Panama, were obtained from Espinasa (2001). The share of private sector participation in the 
distribution activity for Panama was obtained from the regulator of the public services in that country.  
In order to harmonize electricity prices across countries, all prices are in 2001 US dollars per KWh of 
electricity and are expressed in terms of purchasing power parity. 
 
The simple correlations between the share of private sector participation in the 
distribution activity and household prices with taxes, industrial prices with taxes, 
household prices without taxes, and industrial prices without taxes (all corresponding to 
                                                                 
12 The data is from the OLADE data base which only reflects taxes as reported by governments and usually 
tend to ignore subnational taxes which in some countries may bias the analysis.    21 
the year 2001) are 0.07, 0.04, -0.23, and 0.36, respectively. This indicates that electricity 
prices at the household or industrial level, with taxes or without taxes, are not highly 
correlated with ownership. 
The following table shows the average 2001 prices by type of regulatory regime. 
Table 8: Average electricity prices across countries by type of regulatory regime 
  Average prices corresponding to the year 2001 
  With taxes  Without taxes 
Type of regulatory 
regime 
Household  Industrial  Household  Industrial 
Price cap  19.6  13.1  13.8  11.2 
Hybrid  20.7  19.0  15.4  10.4 
Rate of return  15.1  10.4  18.7  7.4 
 
An inspection of Table 8 suggests that there is not a clear pattern of differences in 
electricity prices according to type of regulatory regime. This is to be expected since 
prices are on average driven by the basic technology (% of hydro vs. % of termal) and 
regulation and taxes only influence prices at the margin. 
Price changes vs. labor productivity changes 
As shown in Tables 2 and 6, the average annual rate of labor productivity change 
for the period 1994-2001 has been about 6%. The current debate in the Region is whether 
final consumers have benefited from this increase in labor productivity. As a first 
approach to address this issue, in this section we explore whether the increases in labor 
productivity have had an effect on lower prices for final consumers.  
Table 9 lists the average annual rate of change (over the period 1994-2001) in 
household and industrial electricity prices by country, along with the average annual rate 
of labor productivity change. The countries’ average rate of labor productivity change 
was obtained by adding the interaction between the time trend and the country dummies 
to the model in column (1) of Table 6. Similar conclusions are reached when the   22 
interactions between the time trend and the country dummies are added to the model in 
column (3) of Table 2.  Table 9 shows that the coefficients on labor productivity change 
are negative—i.e. an increase in labor productivity over time—for all countries but 
Venezuela, the only country where private firms operate under a RoR scheme. 
A comparison of the changes in prices and labor productivity reveals that, in most 
cases, final prices to customers did not fall to reflect the huge labor productivity gains 
that were achieved during the period under analysis.  
It should not be concluded, however, that the results presented above provide 
conclusive evidence that consumers have not benefited from the reform process in the 
region. As pointed out by Kridel, Sappington, and Weisman (1996), low service rates is 
just one of many possible benefits from incentive regulation schemes. There is evidence, 
for instance, that quality of service has improved more in those countries under high-
incentive regimes (see the discussion above). Besides that, in most of the countries where 
privatization has taken place, by 2001 no price reviews have taken place. This is 
important given that price cap is known to have an impact on prices only after at least one 
price review. Finally, the final price faced by households and industrial customers is 
influenced not only by the efficiency in the distribution activity, but also by the 
generation and transmission stages. That is, both further research and a longer time 
period after the privatization are needed before general conclusions on whether final 
customers have benefited from the privatization process in the electricity sector can be 
made. 
Table 9: Price changes vs. labor productivity changes 
  Number of observations in the sample  Annual rate of change  
      Regulated by  Prices with taxes  Prices without taxes  LP 
Country  Total  Private   PC  HR  RoR  H  I   H  I   
Argentina  117  70  70  0  0  0.010  0.014  -0.02  0.01  -0.046   23 
(-2.29) 
Bolivia  12  7  0  7  0  -0.083  -0.091  -0.10  -0.11  -0.003 
(-0.08) 
Brazil  113  44  44  0  0  0.032  -0.010  0.04  0.01  -0.091 
(-3.79) 
Chile  14  14  0  14  0  -0.118  -0.102  -0.11  -0.10  -0.061 
(-5.90) 




2  0  0  0  0  -0.025  -0.044      -0.062 
(-1.24) 




12  12  0  12  0  0.137  0.116      -0.020 
(-0.64) 
Mexico  8  0  0  0  0  -0.030  -0.011      -0.035 
(-4.40) 
Paraguay  7  0  0  0  0  0.088  0.042  0.09  0.04  -0.043 
(-3.76) 
Peru  64  24  0  24  0  0.007  -0.001  0.04  -0.01  -0.151 
(-6.05) 
Uruguay  8  0  0  0  0  -0.037  -0.063  -0.05  -0.08  -0.081 
(-9.53) 
Venezuela  36  23  0  0  23  -0.029  -0.282    -0.33  0.036 
(0.97) 
Notes: t-ratios obtained from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
PC = price cap; HR = hybrid regimes; RoR = rate of return; H = household prices; I = industrial prices; LP 
= labor productivity.  
Panama was excluded from the analysis since there is data for only one period. 
All KWh of electricity prices were converted into 2001 price levels using the US Consumer Price Index 
and expressed in terms of purchasing power parity. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this study we compare the relative performance of public and privatized Latin 
American electricity distribution utilities for the years 1994 to 2001. The labor 
productivity analysis gives the following main conclusions: (i) privatized firms are more 
labor efficient than their public counterparts; and (ii) there is evidence of labor 
productivity growth during the period. The results are significant in economic terms—
private firms use about 30% to 45% less labor to produce a given bundle of outputs than 
public firms, and they are relatively robust to controlling for the potential endogeniety of 
ownership that could arise if governments privatized those utilities with the highest labor 
productivity first.    24 
We also analyze the impact of alternative regulatory regimes on efficiency. The 
ideal environment in which to measure the impact of different types of regulatory 
schemes is one in which all factors other than the regulatory regime itself are held 
constant. This was not the environment in which regulatory regimes were introduced in 
Latin America, since high-incentive regulation was introduced at the moment of 
privatization. Besides, the goals of regulators, the laws behind the reform processes, and 
relevant histories all vary across countries. Therefore, empirical findings regarding the 
impact of different regulatory regimes on efficiency must be interpreted with great care. 
Taking the above caveat in mind, labor productivity analysis provides the following 
main results: (i) that private firms operating under price cap and hybrid schemes are more 
labor efficient than both public firms and private firms under rate of return regulation; (ii) 
that firms regulated under hybrid regimes have intermediate efficiency levels; and (iii) 
that private firms operating under rate of return regulation have, at most, similar labor 
efficiency as public firms. Result (i) and (ii) are consistent with the prediction from 
theory and with the findings of similar studies conducted for electricity distribution and 
other sectors.  
Overall, the empirical evidence presented here does not provide definitive 
conclusions about the effects of privatization and incentive regulation on the efficiency of 
electricity distribution firms in Latin America in the period 1 994-2001 since some 
important variables are missing from the analysis. For similar reasons, the evidence is 
also only partial on whether final customers have been benefited from the sector’s 
reforms but it does suggest that price changes from the viewpoint of users and efficiency 
gains are not as correlated as expected. The difference between users price and efficiency   25 
changes is shared between operators and government in the form of rents and additional 
tax revenue respectively. Additional research, which  includes the collection of 
comparable data on service quality and a longer period of analysis, is however required to 
refine the assessment.  
   26 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we present the data used in the empirical analysis. Before that, we 
briefly describe the main characteristics of the Latin American electricity sector and of 
the reforms that have taken place in the sector in the past 20 years. 
Latin American electricity distribution sector 
The Latin American electricity market has undergone a major transformation over 
the past 20 years. Reform in the region started in Chile with the privatization of major 
electric utilities between 1986 and 1989. Argentina followed Chile’s example in 1992; 
shortly thereafter Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru followed suit. During the second half of 
the 1990s, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Brazil also 
adopted reforms. The main missing players in the process of transforming the electricity 
sectors have been Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 
although Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela recently initiated actions toward 
restructuring.  
The diversity in the size of countries and power demand in the region—Brazil has a 
population of 160 million and an installed capacity of 58000 MW, while Honduras has 
4.4 million people and 396 MW—but all have followed similar paths for reforms. The 
reform processes in the region have been based on a central change in the paradigm for 
the electrical business. The paradigm has evolved from a stated-owned, vertically 
integrated electricity monopoly, to one in which different economic characteristics are 
recognized in the generation, transmission, and distribution stages. Competition among 
private operators is established in generation, with the State regulating transmission and 
distribution activities.   30 
As shown in Table A.1, however, in many Latin American countries the state still 
controls sizeable amounts of the generation, transmission, and distribution segments.
13  
Table A.1: Share of private sector participation in selected countries (in percent) 
  Generation  Transmission  Distribution 
Argentina  60  100  70 
Bolivia  90  90  90 
Brazil  30  10  60 
Chile  90  90  90 
Colombia  70  10  50 
Costa Rica  10  0  10 
Dominican Republic  60  0  50 
Ecuador  20  0  30 
El Salvador  40  0  100 
Guatemala  50  0  100 
Mexico  10  0  0 
Paraguay  0  0  0 
Peru  60  20  80 
Uruguay  0  0  0 
Venezuela  20  10  40 
Source: Espinasa (2001). 
 
The average percentages of private participation are roughly 41%, 22%, and 51% 
for generation, transmission, and distribution—with a much lower variance for generation 
than for the other segments of the business. Generation has remained fully public only in 
Paraguay and Uruguay while transmission is mostly private only in Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Chile. The largest diversity of organizational arrangements is found in distribution; 
the distribution activity has remained fully public in three countries (Mexico, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay) and it has been fully transferred to the private sector in two countries (El 
Salvador and Guatemala). In most of the countries in the region public and private 
operators share the distribution market. From the viewpoint of efficiency concerns, this 
diversity is useful since it allows some degree of competition by comparison, and it 
generates enough diversity in the sample to allow an assessment of the impact of reform 
on the efficiency levels of the operators. 
                                                                 
13 For a description of the reforms in the region, see Dussan (1996); Rudnick (1998); Fischer and Serra 
(2000); Espinasa (2001); Millan, Lora, and Micco (2001); Rudnick and Zolezzi (2001).   31 
Table A.2 lists the type of regulatory regime by country.  
Table A.2: Regulatory regimes in selected countries 
  Electricity distribution 
Argentina  Price cap 
Bolivia  Hybrid 
Brazil  Price cap 
Chile  Hybrid 
Colombia  Price cap 
Costa Rica  Rate of return 
Ecuador  Hybrid 
El Salvador  Hybrid 
Mexico  Rate of return 
Paraguay  Rate of return 
Panama  Price cap 
Peru  Hybrid 
Uruguay  Rate of return 
Venezuela  Rate of return 
 Source: Espinasa (2001). 
About a third of the countries in the region have adopted a price-cap scheme while 
another third rely on rate of return regulation. The last third has adopted hybrid regimes 
in which some cost changes are automatically passed through to tariffs. This is clearly a 
very rough classification of the regulatory regimes since the incentive for improvements 
in efficiency are strongly correlated with the specific design of the overall regulatory 
regime. In the case of hybrid regimes, for instance, the larger the share of costs enjoying 
an automatic pass-through rule, the closer the regime is to cost-plus and hence the lower 
the expected incentive to minimize costs. The classification is, however, useful enough to 
allow an explicit modelling of the influence of broad categories of regulation on the 
efficiency of the operators. 
The database 
Data on firms was collected from several sources. Data for South America in the 
period 1994-2000 was mostly compiled from CIER (commission that co-ordinates the 
different participants in the electricity sector in South America) reports:  Datos 
Estadísticos. Empresas Eléctricas. Año 1994; Datos Estadísticos. Empresas Eléctricas.   32 
Años 1995-1996-1997; Información Económica y Técnica de Empresas Eléctricas. Datos 
1998-1999; and Información Económica y Técnica de Empresas Eléctricas. Datos 2000. 
Data for Argentina in the year 2001 was provided by ADEERA (an institution that co-
ordinates firms in the Argentine electricity sector). Other South American d ata 
corresponding to the year 2001 were obtained from firms’ balance sheets. Data for Costa 
Rica was provided by the energy department of ARESEP (regulator of public services in 
Costa Rica). Data for Panama was obtained from the firm’s balance sheet. Data for 
Mexico was provided by CFE (federal commission of electricity). Data for El Salvador 
was provided by SIGET (regulator of the electricity and telecommunication sectors in El 
Salvador).  
Most of the data was checked using information provided by regulators and 
governmental agencies. In this respect, we used information provided by ADEERA, 
ENRE (regulator of the electricity sector in Argentina), ANEEL (national agency of 
electrical energy, Brazil), CONELEC (governmental agency in charge of the electricity 
sector in Ecuador), CTE (commission in charge of energy tariffs in Peru), and URSEA 
(regulator of the service of water and energy in Uruguay).  
The database includes the following variables:  
•  sales to final customers, in GWh. Sales to final customers were calculated as 
total sales minus sales to other electric companies, in order to isolate the 
distribution activity in the case of integrated firms; 
•  number of final customers; 
•  service area, in square kilometres; 
•  residential sales’ share, a proxy for demand structure;   33 
•  total distribution lines, in kilometres (including high and low voltage power 
lines);  
•  total transformer capacity, in mega-volt-amper, MVA; 
•  number of employees. Data on number of employees includes information on 
part-time and full-time employees. Part-time employees were counted as half-
time employees. In vertically integrated firms there is information on the 
number of employees employed by each department: generation, transmission, 
distribution, billing and collection, and administrative.  For these firms, the 










=++ ￿￿  where  1j l = distribution (proper);  2 j l = billing 
and collection;  3 j l = generation;  4 j l = transmission; and  5 j l = administrative and 
general. 
The sample is representative of the electricity distribution sector in the region. It 
covers 110 firms from the following countries: Argentina (22 firms supplying electricity 
to 70% of the total number of customers in the country), Bolivia (2, 30%), Brazil (37, 
70%), Chile (2, 19%), Colombia (5, 34%), Costa Rica (3, 80%), Ecuador (12, 60%), El 
Salvador (4, 95%), Mexico (1, 79%), Panama (1, 62%), Paraguay (1, 100%), Peru (11, 
97%), Uruguay (1, 100%), and Venezuela (8, 92%). 
In the empirical applications we also use information on GNP per capita. 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates of GNP per capita were obtained from the 
World Bank database. We use PPP figures in order to correct for international differences 
in relative prices (for details, see World Development Report technical notes).    34 
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